Irony of the golden age of accounting methodolgy by Mouck, Tom
Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 16
Issue 2 December 1989 Article 3
1989
Irony of the golden age of accounting methodolgy
Tom Mouck
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mouck, Tom (1989) "Irony of the golden age of accounting methodolgy," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 16 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
The Accounting Historians Journal 
Vol. 16, No. 2 
December 1989 
Tom Mouck 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO 
THE IRONY OF "THE GOLDEN AGE" 
OF ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY 
Abstract: Developments in accounting methodology during the 
1960s are contrasted with concurrent developments in philosophy 
of science. The 1960s was a decade characterized by the widespread 
adoption of "the scientific method" in accounting methodology. 
The same decade was characterized by the degeneration of any 
semblance of consensus among philosophers of science regarding 
the nature of scientific inquiry. The irony of these incongruous but 
simultaneous developments is highlighted with the intent of 
weakening the current atmosphere of uncritical reverence for 
science and "the scientific method" in accounting research. A more 
contemporary (and more open) view of science — the postempiri-
cist view — also is discussed. 
Ruth Hines recently has expressed concern about dogmatic 
tendencies in accounting research; tendencies which are linked 
to "an unwarranted reverence for science and 'the scientific 
method' " [1988, pp. 660-61]. Reverence for "the scientific 
method" can be traced to developments in the 1960s — the 
decade that has been dubbed "The Golden Age" of accounting 
methodology [Graffikin, 1988]. The 1960s also has been referred 
to as the "Decade of Awakening" [Dyckman and Zeff, 1984, p. 
233] — the decade during which accounting researchers awoke 
to the scientific method. This is highly ironic because the 1960s 
was the decade that saw the deterioration of any semblance of 
consensus among philosophers of science. Just as accounting 
r e s e a r c h e r s were d i s cove r ing "the s c i en t i f i c m e t h o d " 
philosophers of science were witnessing its disintegration. The 
aim of this article is to undermine the atmosphere of dogmatism 
noted by Hines by highlighting the irony of the Golden Age of 
accounting methodology and calling attention to a more con-
temporary (more open) view of science that has been referred to 
as the postempiricist view. 
THE 1960s: A DECADE OF AWAKENING 
FOR ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY 
There is no question that the 1960s represent a watershed in 
accounting research. Gaffikin [1987] has argued that, with few 
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exceptions, pre-1960 accounting research was philosophically 
and methodologically unsophisticated. Researchers provided 
descriptive catalogues of existing practices and at tempted to 
uncover rules for improving accounting practices. 
Post-1960s accounting research is a radically different story. 
The mainstream journals reflect an increasing obsession with 
empirical research that is presumed to be in accordance with 
the principles of scientific inquiry. The journals are loaded with 
mathemat ical model-building, hypotheses testing, esoteric 
statistical techniques, and so forth. And even though the articles 
reflect considerable theoretical diversity, they suggest wide-
spread agreement regarding scientific methodology. In fact, 
Chua [1986] has argued that 
. . . accounting research has been guided by a domi-
nant . . . set of assumptions. There has been one gen-
eral scientific world-view, one primary discipline 
matrix. And accounting researchers, as a community 
of scientists, have shared and continue to share a 
constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques. These 
beliefs c i rcumscr ibe defini t ions of "wor thwhi le 
problems" and "acceptable scientific evidence." [p. 
602] 
The "scientific" world-view of mainstream accounting re-
searchers, according to Chua, is grounded in a belief that 
"reali ty" exists independently of the human subject. Theories, 
in the mainstream view, "are put forward as at tempts to 
discover a knowable, objective reality" [Chua, 1986, p. 606]. And 
since objective reality is taken to be separate from theoretical 
constructs, "Accounting researchers believe in the empirical 
testability of scientific theories" [Chua, 1986, p. 607]. 
This dominant "scientific" world-view has its roots in the 
literature of the 1960s. These roots have recently been traced by 
Gaffikin in his 1988 article, "Legacy of the Golden Age". He 
argues that, "despite the different research methods employed, 
because the ontological and epistemological presuppositions are 
the same, the methodological underpinnings have remained 
fairly constant" [1988, p. 16]. And he maintains that these 
methodological underpinnings are primarily due to the influ-
ence of four researchers — Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and 
Sterling. 
These writers were well versed in philosophy of science and 
were anxious to extend the scientific method to accounting 
thought. Chambers, for instance, writes in a "Working Paper" 
for The Academy of Accounting Historians: 
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By 1954 I believed it necessary, at least for myself, to 
set down the way in which a theory of accounting 
should be developed. In none of the important works 
on accounting was there a treatment of methodology. 
There was no pattern to follow except that of the 
well-developed sciences. And writers on accounting 
were following no pat tern. My principal formal 
guides were Cohen and Nagel's An Introduction to 
Logic and Scientific Method, Larrabee 's Reliable 
Knowledge and Robbins' The Nature and Significance 
of Economic Science. . . .I wrote "Blueprint for a 
Theory of Accounting" in 1955 and two other pieces 
shortly afterward in response to some criticism. I 
returned to the matter in the early sixties because no 
material change had occurred in the way in which 
accountants dealt with the construction and valida-
tion of their ideas [p. 8]. 
Devine emphasizes, " that measurement is a process that 
requires extremely high levels of abstraction" [1966, p. 14]. And 
he references Milton Friedman's "Essay on the Methodology of 
Positive Economics" in his discussion of the appraisal of 
abstractions. "The prospects for appraising such abstractions by 
the 'realism' of their components instead of by the relationship 
of their output to goals and need is dim indeed (See Friedman 
[7])" [Devine, 1966, p. 14]. This is apparently a reference to 
Friedman's notorious claim about the irrelevance of the realism 
of assumptions and his emphasis on predictive capability. In the 
same article Devine claims that, "The common core of scientific 
methods is the interworking of observation and deduction, and 
it should be clear that one can construct a predictive social 
theory only in conjunction with empirical and behavioral as-
sumptions" [p. 26]. 
Mattessich, in his 1964 book Accounting and Analytical 
Methods, criticizes the current state of both accounting theory 
and accounting pedagogy. "Accounting theory," he says, "has 
developed a body of knowledge which is of a dogmatic rather 
than scientific-hypothetical character and which serves with 
satisfaction only purposes of a legalistic nature" [p. 4]. And he 
chastises academic accounting for its over-emphasis on techni-
cal aspects of existing practice. "It leaves the student at a loss 
when it comes to expressing accounting theory in terms of 
modern logic, epistemology, and quantitative analysis" [Mat-
tessich, p. 4]. "The accountant 's dilemma," Mattessich suggests, 
"is not merely a problem of memorizing some formulas or 
learning new mathematical tricks, it is a problem of transition 
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f rom the dogmat ic th inking of the j u r i s p r u d e n t to the 
behavioral-analytical thinking of the scientist" [p. x]. 
Finally, Gaffikin cites Sterling's Theory of the Measurement 
of Enterprise Income as one of the major works of the decade, 
noting that although it was not published until 1970 it was 
written ten years previously and portions of it were reflected in 
Sterling's other published works in the 1960s. Gaffikin also 
notes that Sterling's views on accounting theory are very similar 
to those of Chambers. Both Chambers and Sterling advocate the 
adoption of accounting based on exit-prices because these are 
empirically observable data. 
Graffikin emphasizes the methodological s imilar i t ies 
among Chambers, Devine, Mattessich and Sterling, but there 
are also significant differences; most notably with respect to 
Devine's pragmatic orientation. Compared with Sterling, for 
instance, Devine is much more circumspect regarding the na-
ture of facts, truth, and the potential for scientific accounting. 
For Sterling, "Scientific knowledge is intended to refer to real 
things in the real world" [1976, p. 83], and competing hypoth-
eses are empirically tested to find out "which is most in 
harmony with the facts of observation" [1976, p. 83]. An "em-
pirical test," for Sterling, "simply means that one looks at real 
things in the real world to find out what is t rue" [1976, p. 83]. 
Accordingly, he maintains that accounting is in need of a 
redefinition: "we must define it [accounting] as a process of 
keeping track of real things in the real world" [1976, p. 85]. His 
candidate for an empirical base for accounting is, of course, ext 
values — "they are useful to a great many decisions . . . [and] 
they are subject to empirical test, we will be able to resolve 
disputes about them" [1976, p. 87]. 
Devine, on the other hand, maintains that "the facts of a 
case are determined by objectives" [1985, Vol. V, p. 57]. And as 
Arrington points out, "for Devine and the pragmatists, [truth is] 
something that a community finds useful to believe, and useful 
for definite assignable reasons that have to do with ways in 
which problems can be solved and life can be changed" [p. 139]. 
Also, for Devine and the pragmatists, if seems doubtful that 
science can find "any universal principles that are 'basic' to all 
cultures for eternity" [1985, Vol. Ill, p. 14]. And it is understand-
able that Devine would seem to suggest, in the words of one 
reviewer, " that it will not be possible to develop a global set of 
accounting principles" [Anton, et. al., p. 413]. 
Neither is it possible, from Devine's perspective, for accoun-
tants (or even scientists) to eliminate values from their work: 
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"everything of consequence done by accountants has ethical 
content in the sense that their decisions help or harm various 
individuals" [1985, Vol. V, p. 5]. And in response to Chambers' 
claim that, "Our inquiry, like that of economics, 'is entirely 
neutral between ends' . . . " [quoted by Devine, 1985, Vol. Ill, p. 
391, Devine responds as follows: "Advocacy of neutrality is . . . 
insidious. It is an offspring of the discredited doctrine of ob-
serving the (!) facts. . . . Facts are interpretations relevant to a 
viewpoint" [1985, Vol. III, p. 40]. 
But regardless of differences, Chambers, Devine, Mattessich 
and Sterling were major influences on the new directions taken 
in accounting methodology and research. Their scientifically-
oriented works on accounting theory, however, were not the 
only influences that made the 1960s a watershed decade for 
accounting research. As Whitley [1986 & 1988] has pointed out, 
social, political and economic events as well as institutional 
developments all played a role in transforming academic ac-
counting research, and helped pave the way for the increasingly 
dominant emphasis on quantitative ("scientific") accounting 
research. Following the Soviet Union's successful launching of 
Sputknik, the U.S. in the late fifties and early sixties was 
pervaded by a sense of urgency to expand scientific and mathe-
matical training. And following the successful employment of 
scientific research and operations research methods in World 
War II, there was widespread belief " that 'science' could be 
applied to managerial and business problems and scientific 
research into these problems should be supported" [Whitley, 
1986, p. 171]. More concisely, the Ford and Carnegie Founda-
tions had both published reports in 1959 encouraging "an 
expansion of 'scientific' research in U.S. business schools"; 
reports which were subsequently backed up by "substantial 
grants and publishing opportunities" [Whitley, 1988, p. 641]. In 
short, the stage was set for the emergence of a community of 
accounting researchers who shared a commitment to empirical 
("scientific") research. 
Supportive technology also was available. The 1960s was a 
decade of rapidly expanding compute r avai labi l i ty and 
computer-generated data; developments which greatly ex-
tended the possibilities for statistical work. And other develop-
ments of the 1960s, most notably the emergence of the efficient 
markets literature in economics and the capital asset pricing 
model in finance, further accelerated the pace of empirical 
research in accounting [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 236]. 
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On all fronts the 1960s was, in the words of Dyckman and 
Zeff, "a pivotal decade" for accounting research [p. 236]: "In the 
literature of accounting research, the 1960s was the Decade of 
Awakening" [p. 233]. The American Accounting Association 
initiated a series of Studies in Accounting Research. Stanford 
University, the University of Chicago, and the University of 
Kansas initiated conferences and symposia focusing on empiri-
cal research and methodology. And in 1966 the Journal of 
Accounting Research began publishing "a series of annual Sup-
plements that were devoted almost exclusively to the empirical 
research papers presented at Chicago's Conference on Empirical 
Research in Accounting" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 269]. 
It is ironic, however, that accounting researchers were 
awakening to the scientific method of inquiry just as events in 
philosophy of science were raising doubts about the validity of 
any exclusive approach to inquiry. In 1965, the same year that 
saw "the first university-sponsored conference dedicated wholly 
to accounting research" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 234], an interna-
tional symposium on philosophy of science was held in London 
to explore the challenges presented by Thomas Kuhn's The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (originally published in 1962). 
Papers presented by some of the worlds leading philosophers of 
science were later published in a volume entitled Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge. Philosophy of science has not been the 
same since. Indeed, as economic methodologist Douglas Hands 
recently pointed out, philosophy of science "has undergone a 
major upheaval during the last twenty years. The so-called 
'received view' of the preceding epoch is dead" [Hands, 1984, p. 
116]. 
THE 1960S: A DECADE OF TURMOIL 
IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Modern Western society has tended toward the notion that 
the only valid truth claims are those resulting from the scientific 
process. And until the last twenty-five years or so, philosophers 
of science considered it their duty to provide prescriptions for 
scientific practice, and to provide philosophical explanations for 
why the truth claims of science are epistemologically valid. The 
following is a very brief sketch of the dominant view in pre-
1960s philosophy of science. Based on empirical observations, 
scientists formulate general laws via a process of induction. The 
general laws must satisfy both logical and empirical conditions 
of adequacy. They must be logically necessary for deduction of 
the initially observed data, and they must be capable of empiri-
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cal testing. The adequacy (or truth) of such laws is judged on the 
basis of their ability to predict the phenomena under considera-
tion. 
Sir Karl Popper, in his classic work, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (originally published in 1934), rejected this view of 
scientific method because of its reliance on induction. A logical 
deduction is complete in and of itself. An inductive inference, 
however, can never be complete in and of itself because it has to 
be based on limited experience and future experience may (in a 
logical sense) contradict any inductive inference. It is thus 
impossible to conclusively prove the t ruth of any theory. Popper 
therefore turned to falsification as a basis for philosophy of 
science with the idea that, if theories are repeatedly subjected to 
at tempts at falsification, then scientific knowledge can, at least, 
grow ever closer to the truth as false theories are rejected. 
Popper's falsificationism has been very influential in that it 
is often cited as the legitimate basis for scientific methodology. 
Unfortunately Popper also has been widely misunderstood. 
Naive empiricists (including mainstream accounting research-
ers) have assumed Popper to be arguing as follows: whereas no 
amount of confirmatory empirical evidence can conclusively 
prove the truth of a theory, it can be conclusively disproven by 
contradictory empirical evidence. But Popper expressly denied 
any such claim. "In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a 
theory can ever be produced. . . . If you insist on strict proof (or 
strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit 
from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are" 
[Popper, 1968, p. 50]. 
What can be established with logical conclusiveness is the 
consistency or inconsistency of a set of propositions. Thus, for an 
empirical science the relevant propositions can be sub-divided 
into theoretical propositions and observational propositions in 
such a way that their logical consistency or inconsistency can be 
readily determined. In Popper's falsificationist philosophy of 
science, a theory is considered to be "falsified" when a con-
tradictory observation statement is accepted [1968, p. 86]. 
An initial problem for this sort of falsificationism, if it 
claims to be both logical and empirical is that it is not possible 
to deduce observational propositions from pure experience. Any 
observational proposition, Popper points out, 
. . .[goes] far beyond what can be known with cer-
tainty 'on the basis of immediate experience'. . . . 
Every description uses universal names (or symbols, 
or ideas); every statement has the character of a 
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theory, of a hypothesis. The statement, 'Here is a glass 
of water ' cannot be verified by any observational 
experience. The reason is that the universals which 
appear in it cannot be correlated with any specific 
sense-experience. (An ' immediate experience' is only 
once ' immediately given'; it is unique.) By the word 
'glass', for example, we denote physical bodies which 
exhibit a certain law-like behavior, and the same 
holds for the word 'water ' . Universals cannot be 
reduced to classes of experiences; they cannot be 
'constituted' [1968, pp. 94-95]. 
Furthermore, any proposition which reports sensory experi-
ence must rely on some theory of perception, and of course no 
theory of perception can ever be conclusively proven true because 
of the problem of induction. And any observations that rely on 
instruments (microscopes or telescopes, for instance) rely on 
additional theories (a theory of optics). In short, there is no realm 
of non-theoretical facts against which theories can be tested. 
Popper's solution to these problems (and others) is to take a 
methodological decision; a decision to regard the supporting 
theories as "unproblematic background knowledge" — "Let h 
be the hypothesis to be tested; let e be the test statement (the 
evidence), and b the 'background knowledge', that is to say, all 
those things which we accept (tentatively) as unproblematic 
while we are testing the theory" [Popper, 1965, p. 390]. 
With due regard to the extent of the qualifications and 
methodological decisions entailed, Popper's falsificationism can 
be summarized as follows: 
According to my proposal, what characterizes the 
empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsifi-
cation, in every conceivable way, the system to be 
tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable 
systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which 
is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to 
the fiercest struggle for survival [Popper, 1968, p. 42]. 
Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science is significantly 
different from its predecessors which are often characterized as 
verificationist philosophy of science. Both, however, are pre-
scriptivist philosophies of science which perpetuate the notion 
that scientific truth claims are epistemologically superior to 
those of folklore, art, literature, religion, metaphysics, etc. The 
epistemological virtues of science, according to both verifica-
tionists and falsificationists, rely on the notion that science is 
essentially characterized by empiricism and rationality. 
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The 1962 publication of Thomas Kuhn's popular and influ-
ential The Structure of Scientific Revolutions posed a challenge to 
Popperian falsificationism and kicked off what has come to be 
known as the 'growth of knowledge' movement in philosophy of 
science. Kuhn's work seemed to 'pull the rug from under ' the 
claim that science is a rational enterprise. According to Kuhn, 
some of the most crucial aspects of scientific advance are 
determined by non-rational factors. 
According to Kuhn, most scientific activity is carried out 
within an accepted theoretical framework which has been built 
upon past scientific achievements. The accepted theoretical 
framework reflects certain beliefs about the world, and it serves 
as a foundation for the articulation of problems that must be 
solved if the range of explanatory power is to be extended. 
Furthermore, even the methods of research that were used in the 
foundational achievements tend to be accepted as the legitimate 
methods, and thus perpetuated. All of this adds up to what Kuhn 
characterizes as paradigm-based research. The term "para-
digm", in the broad sense, "stands for the entire constellation of 
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a 
given community" [Kuhn, p. 175]. Paradigm-based research is 
what Kuhn refers to as "normal science". It is research aimed at 
the fleshing out and extension of the already accepted theoreti-
cal framework. Contradictory theories and viewpoints tend to 
be suppressed by the established scientific community. Kuhn 
claims that the research problems pursued tend to be those seen 
as holding the most promise for such fleshing-out and extension, 
and has likened the process to puzzle-solving. 
In the process of carrying out normal science, scientists 
inevitably encounter discrepancies between the theoretical 
structure and nature. Such discrepancies can generate a crisis 
and spawn competing paradigms which challenge the dominant 
paradigm. Such crises and how they are resolved probably 
represent the most controversial aspect of Kuhn's ideas. They 
also represent the most fundamental challenge to Popper's 
concern with the rational growth of scientific knowledge. While 
Popper agrees that such periods exist and are, in fact, essential 
to scientific progress, he believes that scientists can and do 
rationally evaluate alternative paradigms. Kuhn, on the other 
hand, sees such choices as essentially extra-rational or, at least, 
strongly influenced by non-rational factors. He deliberately uses 
"revolution" as a metaphor because of parallels he sees between 
political and scientific change. He classifies as scientific revolu-
tions, "those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which 
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an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an 
incompatible new one" [Kuhn, p. 92]. 
Kuhn maintains that scientific revolutions are important 
stages in the growth of scientific knowledge that fall outside the 
logically controlled processes of normal science. He refers to a 
decision to adopt a new paradigm as a conversion experience 
that cannot be forced by logic. Since the conversion results in (or 
from?) a new way of seeing the world, Kuhn likens the process to 
a visual "gestalt" switch, or to a man who has put on inverting 
lenses. "Confronting the same constellation of objects as before 
and knowing that he does so, he nevertheless finds them trans-
formed through and through in many of their details" [Kuhn, p. 
122]. 
These are the kinds of arguments that have produced 
charges that Kuhn's ideas lead straight to relativism and irra-
tionality. Kuhn also has been criticized for turning to social 
psychology for enlightenment regarding scientific method. In an 
at tempt to maintain Kuhn's descriptive accuracy without re-
sorting to social psychology, the late philosopher Imre Lakatos 
developed the "methodology of scientific research programmes" 
(MSRP); a descriptive philosophy of science which does not 
undermine the notion that science is thoroughly rational. 
According to Lakatos, most of the significant series of 
theories in the growth of scientific knowledge are welded to-
gether into research programmes by a certain continuity of 
conceptual framework. Scientists working within a programme, 
tend to work as if they had agreed at an early stage on a set of 
methodological rules. The most basic "agreement" concerns the 
conceptual framework that will not be subject to rejection. 
Lakatos characterizes this as the "hard core" of the programme. 
Scientists working within the programme then use their "inge-
nuity to articulate or even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses,' which 
form a protective belt around this core. . . . It is this protective 
belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests 
and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, 
to defend the thus-hardened core" [Lakatos, p. 133]. 
Lakatos downplays the instances of widespread abandon-
ment of one research programme in favor of another, the sort of 
situation Kuhn describes as a religious sort of conversion. 
Lakatos claims that there can be objective reasons for reject-
ing one programme for another: "such an objective reason is 
provided by a rival research programme which explains the 
previous success of its rival and supersedes it by a further 
display of heuristic power" [Lakatos, p. 155]. 
10
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Another important voice in the philosophy of science debate 
is that of Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend, a self-declared anar-
chist, has laid out an outline of an anarchistic theory of knowl-
edge in his celebrated work Against Method. He claims " tha t 
there is only one principle that can be defended under all 
circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the 
principle: anything goes" [Feyerabend, p. 28]. There are always, 
he claims, circumstances in which scientific progress is en-
hanced by disregarding, or even acting contrary to, any 
methodological maxim that has ever been developed. 
Feyerabend considers Lakatos to have made an ingenious 
a t tempt at establishing methodological s tandards for scientific 
progress, but in the final analysis he concludes "there is no 
'rationally' describable difference between Lakatos and my-
self . . . " [Feyerabend, pp. 186-187]. He points out that Lakatos' 
arguments favoring the granting of a "breathing space" for new 
theories and research programmes removes most of the objec-
tions he (Feyerabend) has formerly leveled at a t tempts to 
establish methodological standards. The main point on which 
Feyerabend bases his claim of "no 'rationally' describable dif-
ference" is that Lakatos' standards do not contain any rules that 
tell scientists what to do; nothing is ruled out. 
Feyerabend claims that science does not deserve any special 
consideration or support in a free society. Western rationality 
itself, which science supposedly epitomizes, is only one tradition 
among many. It provdies one way of looking at the world, 
according to Feyerabend. But science, he says, has no legitimate 
claim to superiority over any other sort of knowledge. 
SCIENTISM AND THE "FETISH 
OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH": THE REAL LEGACY 
OF THE GOLDEN AGE? 
Given that the 1960s was the decade when doubt and 
uncertainty about the nature of scientific research dominated 
discussion in philosophy of science it is indeed highly ironic that 
this was also the decade that finally brought "the scientific 
method" to accounting research. But the result has been more 
than ironic. A good argument has been made that the dogmatic 
tendencies currently being manifested in accounting research 
have resulted from first equating knowledge with "scientific 
knowledge," and secondly equating empirical with scientific. 
In a recent Abacus article "Wisdom or Widgets", Dan 
Subotnik points out that the high academic esteem for the 
natural sciences, especially physics, has led to an at tempt to 
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emulate the methods of physics. "When [research] takes place in 
disciplines outside the natural or physical sciences, but using 
the same techniques, it is assumed to be an extended application 
of 'scientific method' " [Subotnik, p. 96]. This, of course, is what 
Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and Sterling did for accounting 
— they introduced the techniques of the natural sciences. 
I hasten to add that I am not suggesting that Chambers, 
Mattessich, Devine and Sterling held scientistic or dogmatic 
views. Far from it. In fact, Gaffikin points out that, "Having 
made his case for scientific method for research, Devine draws 
attention to weaknesses in i t" [1988, p. 22]. And Sterling has 
argued eloquently for methodological tolerance [1971, pp. 1-6]. 
Subsequent researchers, however, have not followed suit; they 
have tended to accept "the scientific method" as an article of 
faith. The result has been aptly described as follows: "Science 
has given us a hammer — to borrow from an old adage — now 
all our problems look like nails" [Subotnik, p. 96]. 
Subotnik suggests that the appeal of "the scientific method" 
to the academic masses is largely due to a fear of taking 
positions that are vulnerable to criticism. The avoidance of 
vulnerability has become institutionalized in academia, and its 
perpetuation seems to be assured by the Ph.D. dissertation 
process. "We have an operating rule in academia, that in writing 
a dissertation one should continuously narrow one's vision. The 
common wisdom is that the supreme, if not the only, objective 
in a dissertation is to make a statement that is unassailable" 
[Subotnik, p. 104]. And in disciplines which have become en-
amored of "the scientific method" the avoidance of vulnerabil-
ity has manifested itself in a penchant for "ha rd" or empirical 
research. I would argue further that the penchant for empirical 
research in accounting has been fed by the ready availability of 
empirical data in the form of securities prices, in conjunction 
with the ready availability of theories from economics and 
finance (the efficient markets hypothesis and the capital assets 
pricing model) which can be used to relate accounting numbers 
to securities prices. 
In any case, the scientific ideals introduced into accounting 
by Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and Sterling in the 1960s have 
been adopted by subsequent academic accountants who are less 
familiar (or in many cases, totally unfamiliar) with philosophy 
of science. This has resulted in accounting research that is 
largely characterized by a scientistic att i tude: "On the whole, 
our working image of science can be reduced to a single 
narrowly positivistic principle: Truth is to be found only 
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through application of empirical methods" [Subotnik, p. 97]. 
Subotnik suggests that we call this "the Principle of Quantita-
tive Unassailability" [p. 97]. The Principle of Quantitative Un-
assailability, he claims, has tended to erase the distinctions 
between academic research and factory work. 
As "techniques" are increasingly refined for reducing 
the "scientific method" to a guarantee of empirical 
quantifiability, the pursuit of knowledge is turned into 
the production of research, and knowledge itself be-
comes a product or commodity. Once the benefits of 
the Quantitative Unassailability Principle becomes 
apparent — that is, foreclosure of debate over the 
importance or the integrity of the argument — it is 
only a matter of time until, for similar reasons, five 
articles necessarily become better than three. In other 
words, researchers over time came to superimpose 
another quantitative business paradigm upon their 
work product — factory output [Subotnik, pp. 99-100]. 
In short, what started as a move toward more scientific 
accounting research, has largely degenerated to scientism and 
dogmatism. Many of the most prominent accounting research-
ers have developed an atti tude that theirs is the only legitimate 
form of research. Watts and Zimmerman provide the most 
conspicuous case in point. In their 1986 book Positive Account-
ing Theory they pretentiously announce that, "Throughout this 
book, we use science's concept of theory (positive theory)" [p. 
338]. And they denigrate research efforts that fall outside their 
own variety of economics-based empirical research (what they 
call positive research). The demand for other types of account-
ing literature, according to them, can be thought of as "the 
demand for excuses" [p. 339]. This att i tude also has been 
fostered by editors of some of the leading journals. For instance, 
it has been reported that Nicolas Dopuch, as long-time editor of 
the Journal of Accounting Research, has commented that "he 
sought to kill ' the traditional form of normative theorizing' " 
[Gaffikin, 1988, p. 24]. This sort of reverence for empirical 
("scientific") research naturally filters down to hiring practices 
in academia. Subotnik notes that, "I myself was once told at the 
outset of a job interview: 'This is a statistically oriented de-
par tment . We look for people who can complement [or was it 
"compliment"?] our work' " [p. 102]. 
These scientistic tendencies in current accounting research 
are certainly cause for concern. Such concern has been suc-
cinctly expressed by Stephen Zeff in his departing Accounting 
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Review editorial [1983]; concern about the consequences of 
narrowness and overspecialization in accounting research. He 
suggests that " the 'wave of rigor' that has engulfed the ac-
counting literature since the 1960s has led to a lesser inclination 
to tackle big questions" [p. 133]. In fact, "i t [often] seems that 
manuscripts are the result of methods in search of questions, 
rather than questions in search of methods" [p. 134]. More 
specifically, Zeff is concerned that the over-emphasis on empiri-
cal research may eventually result in the complete elimination 
of historical scholarship in accounting [p. 134]. 
There is, however, in my opinion, good basis for optimism 
regarding a reversal of this scientistic trend — there is evidence 
of a "reawakening" in accounting research. I am referring 
primarily to the increasing stream of articles on methodology. 
The last three or four years have witnessed articles tracing the 
history of methodological perspectives [Gaffikin, 1987, 1988]; 
articles criticizing the established, or prominent, methodologi-
cal views [Lehman & Tinker, 1987; Whitley, 1988; Whittington, 
1987; Hines, 1988; Subotnik, 1988; Tinker, 1988]; and articles 
exploring new methodological perspectives [Chua, 1986, 1986a; 
Cooper & Hopper, 1987; Hopper et. al, 1987; Hopwood, 1987; 
Laughlin, 1987; Lavorie, 1987; Richardson, 1987; Morgan, 1988; 
Arrington & Francis, 1989]. This is a very encouraging trend. 
Methodological debate is the natural enemy of the dogmatic, 
scientistic atti tude. Methodological debate opens up other ways 
of viewing the world and knowledge of the world. 
But in addition to the anti-dogmatic virtues of meth-
odological discussion, it is especially encouraging to note that 
the discussion is introducing accounting researchers to a radi-
cally different view of science than the outmoded positivistic/ 
empiricist conception they have received from mainstream 
accounting "methodologists." Accounting researchers are being 
exposed to what Richard Bernstein and other philosophers refer 
to as "postempiricist philosophy and history of science" [Bern-
stein, p. 22]. 
THE POSTEMPIRICIST VIEW OF SCIENCE: 
THE LEGACY OF THE GROWTH-OF-KNOWLEDGE DEBATE 
Bernstein has noted that traditional empiricist philosophy 
of science assumes such things as the following: experience is 
objective and testable; the language of science is exact, for-
malizable, and literal; meanings are separate from facts; etc. [p. 
32]. But largely as a result of the "growth of knowledge" debate, 
the component elements of the traditional empiricist view are 
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almost universally considered to have been discredited and a 
new, postempiricist view of science has emerged. From the 
postempiricist perspective: scientific theories are ways of inter-
preting nature; facts are, to a significant degree, constituted by 
theory; the language of science is inescapably metaphorical and 
inexact; meanings are generated by the community of inquirers 
and are understood by theoretical coherence rather than by 
correspondence with facts; and so forth [Bernstein, p. 33]. The 
most salient feature of postempiricist philosophy and history of 
science is, according to Bernstein, its "recovery of the herme-
neutical dimension of science". The hermeneutical dimension 
can be explicated very succinctly with reference to the debate 
over rationality. 
Bernstein has noted that three books published within four 
years of each other posed unique and profound implications 
regarding the nature of knowledge and rationality. Kuhn's The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) was essentially con-
cerned with natural science. It touched off a storm of contro-
versy primarily because it was perceived as calling into question 
the rationality of science. In claiming that competing paradigms 
may be incommensurable, that proponents of competing para-
digms are functioning in diffrent "worlds", and that the switch 
from one paradigm to another is comparable to a religious 
conversion or a gestalt switch, Kuhn was seen as denying the 
possibility of a philosophy of science which offers explicit and 
fixed criteria for decisions involving theory choice — "his critics 
took him to be challenging the very rationality and objectivity of 
science" [Bernstein, p. 23]. 
Four years earlier, Peter Winch had published The Idea of 
a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958). It also 
had touched off a storm of controversy. Winch was essentially 
concerned with an analysis of the fundamental contrast between 
the natural and the social sciences at a time when, according to 
Bernstein, "The prevailing atti tude . . . among professional so-
cial scientists was that their discipline was now on the secure 
path of becoming a genuine natural science of individuals in 
society, a natural science that differed in degree and not in kind 
from the rest of the natural sciences" [pp. 26-27]. But the basic 
point of congruence in the respective controversies over Winch's 
book and Kuhn's book concerned the concept of rationality. 
Winch had implied that different cultures may have incommen-
surable standards of rationality. And the implication was made 
more specific in a follow-up essay: "he used the figure of speech 
of 'our standards ' and 'their standards ' of rationality when 
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speaking of modern Western society and the 'primitive' society 
of the Azande" [Bernstein, pp. 27-28]. 
Bernstein points out that in both controversies the critics of 
Kuhn and Winch tended to focus on the problem of coming up 
with a universal standard of rationality. But this focus, Bern-
stein maintains, was off the mark. The real issue, he suggests, is 
more appropriately stated as follows: 
The vital issue here is really the question of what is 
involved in understanding, interpreting, and ex-
plaining alien societies (and not just their rationality 
or lack of rationality). How are we to do justice to the 
strangeness that we discover when we encounter alien 
types of activities, beliefs, rituals, institutions, and 
practices, without falsifying or distorting them? [p. 
28]. 
And this is where Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method 
(originally published in German in 1960) enters the picture. 
Gadamer is the central figure in the contemporary hermeneutics 
movement, and hermeneutics is specifically concerned with the 
processes of interpretation and understanding. 
Traditional hermeneutics focuses on the processes of inter-
preting and understanding texts from a different time, language, 
or culture. But contemporary philosophical hermeneutics as 
developed by Gadamer claims a much more universal applica-
bility. Gadamer claims that all life experiences involve the 
processes of interpretation and understanding. And the rele-
vance of Gadamer in the present discussion is that he denies the 
possibility of an objective rationality that is free of historical 
and cultural context, and offers a different, but non-relativistic, 
notion of reason and rationality. 
Understanding, according to Gadamer, grows out of "ex-
perience" and always involves a "fusion of horizons". An "ex-
perience", as Gadamer uses the term, results from an encounter 
with a new situation or new development. And new situations, 
he contends, are never approached with a clean slate of outlook 
and expectations. We always have a perspective (a "horizon") 
that has been historically shaped by culture, tradition, and 
personal circumstances. And since new situations always in-
volve an element of the unexpected, "experience" generates 
what Gadamer calls "a radical negativity" (the knowledge of not 
knowing) which creates an at t i tude of openness and allows us to 
"see" possibilities that we hadn' t been open to before. We are 
thus changed as a result of the experience; we have a new 
understanding. "The experiencer", says Gadamer, "has ac-
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quired a new horizon within which something can become an 
experience for h im" [p. 317]. 
None of this takes place, however, without language. We are 
born into a linguistic environment; an environment in which 
"reali ty" has already been linguistically classified and ordered. 
We interact via language. Our concepts are linguistically 
shaped. And we think in language. As Bernstein puts it, "for 
him [Gadamer] the medium of all human horizons is linguis-
tic . . . " [p. 144]. The linguistic role is most explicit in 
Gadamer's model of conversation which could be characterized 
as a model for the fusion of interpersonal horizons. 
For two people who do not agree on some subject and who 
wish to achieve agreement, conversation holds the possibility of 
the desired agreement. True conversation, however, is only 
possible if both parties are willing to be open to the other's point 
of view. When both parties are open in this way, then the 
conversation is guided, in a sense, by the subject of the conversa-
tion. The matter under discussion, in this case, generates ques-
tions. On the other hand, if the parties are not open but only 
pretend to be (as in a debating contest), then the questions they 
pretend to have are false questions. Thus, according to Gada-
mer, "a question can be right or wrong, according as it reaches 
into the sphere of the truly open or fails to do so" [p. 327]. 
In the case of false questions, not only do they prohibit the 
issue at hand from being decided, but they stand in the way of 
discovering what Gadamer refers to as " t ru th" . Truth, in the 
sense that Gadamer uses the term, refers to shared understand-
ing and is caught up with the notion of community, as is 
illustrated in the following quote: 
Every conversation presupposes a common language, 
or, it creates a common language. Something is 
placed in the centre, as the Greeks said, which the 
partners to the dialogue both share, and concerning 
which they can exchange ideas with one another. 
Hence agreement concerning the object, which it is 
the purpose of the conversation to bring about, neces-
sarily means that a common language must first be 
worked out in the conversation. This is not an exter-
nal matter of simply adjusting our tools, nor is it even 
right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one 
another but, rather, in the successful conversation 
they both come under the influence of the t ruth of the 
object and are thus bound to one another in a new 
community [p. 341]. 
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Bernstein suggests that the new, postempiricist view of 
science tends to incorporate a view of rationality that is very 
much in tune with Gadamer's model of conversation. The 
proponents of the new view deny the validity of any predeter-
mined algorithmic scheme for evaluating hypotheses, theories, 
and arguments. Instead, they tend to accept what Bernstein has 
called "a dialogical model of rationality that stresses the practi-
cal, communal character of this rationality in which there is 
choice, deliberation, interpretation, judicious weighing and ap-
plication of 'universal criteria,' and even rational disagreement 
about which criteria are relevant and most important" [p. 172]. 
It must be noted that Bernstein does not claim that postem-
piricist philosophers of science were directly borrowing from 
hermeneutics. What he does maintain is that these philosophers, 
via their dialectical give and take concerning the nature of 
scientific inquiry, "have stressed those features of science . . . 
that are hermeneutical" [Bernstein, p. 33]. Most notably with 
respect to Kuhn, Bernstein suggests that he [Kuhn] was groping 
toward a hermeneutical view of rationality: "It is as if he has 
been searching for a proper model to express his awareness that 
such deliberation and choosing [among rival paradigms] are 
rational activities, but not the sort of rational activity that has 
been characterized as deductive proof or empirical verification 
or falsification" [p. 41]. 
In any case, it is obvious that the salient features of the 
postempiricist view, can appropriately be characterized as 
hermenueutical: the questions and problems that deserve atten-
tion emerge from social, cultural and historical circumstances; 
methods of inquiry and standards of judgement are shaped by 
the social practices of the community of scientists; and " t ru th" 
hinges on shared understanding. 
It is also obvious that the postempiricist view of science is 
radically at odds with the dominant view of science among 
accounting researchers. And what is most interesting for the 
present discussion is the fact that many of the (presumably 
scientific) methodological views held by mainstream account-
ing researchers would be seen as unscientific from the postem-
piricist perspective. As Morgan [1988] has pointed out, "The 
idea that accountants represent reality 'as is' through the means 
of numbers that are objective and value free, has clouded the 
much more important insight that accountants are always 
engaged in interpreting a complex reality, partially, and in a 
way that is heavily weighted in favour of what the accountant is 
able to measure and chooses to measure . . . " [p. 480]. And as 
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Hines has suggested, the erroneous and widespread identifica-
tion of statistical procedures with " the scientific method" serves 
to restrain criticalness and creativity in accounting research [p. 
661]. Open discourse in accounting also has been restricted by 
the widespread notion of a logical gulf between positive and 
normative theories. "If one assumes (as many empiricists do) 
that theories can be divided into 'normative' and 'positive' 
frameworks, and that the verity of the latter can be established 
by merely consulting factual evidence, then the scrutiny of 
underlying values slips from explicit at tention, re turning 
covertly in the disguise of 'facts' to participate in deciding what 
passes as ' t ruth ' " [Tinker, p. 183]. And making a similar point 
Arrington and Francis note that, "To deny the value-ladenness 
of one's theorizing is to deny responsibility for the consequences 
of one's theories" [p. 4]. 
Finally, a historical note with respect to Devine must be 
added. Although Devine was a major influence in bringing phi-
losophy of science into accounting thought, there is evidence that 
he is not particularly happy with the outcome (at least as it 
currently stands). In the Preface to Volume V of his "Essays," 
Devine expresses a growing concern "over what appears to be a 
new parochialism in accounting research, i.e., a tendency to 
restr ict research to the nar row confines of quan t i t a t ive 
methods." And one could make a good argument that Devine's 
view of science is much more in tune with the postempiricist view 
than with the mainstream accounting view. In fact, Arrington's 
review of the "Essays" could be construed as such an argument. 
According to Arrington, Devine considered science to be essen-
tially a way of expanding (rather than limiting or closing off) the 
discourse of accounting. And there can be no doubt that Devine's 
pioneering work regarding semiotics helped pave the way for the 
introduction of postempiricist views into accounting literature. 
Devine is fascinated with the role of language in 
constructing knowledge and meaning, and draws 
upon the early work in semiotics and what it might 
have to say to accountants. What he could not have 
foreseen is the way in which semiotics has been 
expanded to the point that, currently, the history of 
ideas is firmly grounded in the overriding importance 
of language in the construction of meaning. Contem-
porary work in hermeneutics, structuralism, and 
poststructuralism that is sweeping the human sci-
ences is beginning to surface in accounting. This work 
owes a debt to Devine for being the first scholar to 
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position accounting firmly in the domain of language 
[Arrington, 1988, p. 1391. 
CONCLUSION 
The juxtaposition of developments in accounting research 
with developments in philosophy of science reveal that " the 
Golden Age" of accounting methodology is caught up in a 
compound irony; an irony that functions on more than one level. 
The most basic irony is. of course, that accounting researchers 
were "awakened" to the scientific method during the same 
decade (the 1960s) that witnessed the disintegration of "the 
received view" of scientific methodology as a result of the 
"growth of knowledge" debate. The second level of irony has to 
do with the respective legacies of "the Golden Age" of account-
ing methodology and the growth of knowledge movement in 
philosophy of science. The legacy of "the Golden Age" seems to 
have been the enshrinement of a dogmatic reverence for a 
positivistic/empiricist research methodology and a research 
environment characterized as "methods in search of questions." 
The growth of knowledge movement, on the other hand, has 
essentially discredited the positivistic/empiricist methodology 
and cleared the way for the emergence of a hermeneutically-
informed postempiricist view of science; a view which acknowl-
edges the social role in the construction of "real i ty" and em-
phasizes the importance of replacing rigid pre-determined 
methodological rules with the give and take of "good conversa-
tion" in the resolution of methodological issues. The ult imate 
irony then is that the research methodology touted by some of 
the most prominent mainstream accounting researchers must 
be iudged clearly "unsc ient i f ic" f rom the postempiricis t 
philosophy of science perspective. 
Mainstream accounting researchers would do well to pon-
der the advice of an outsider: "Accountants can begin making 
themselves 'more scientific' by shedding their guilt for being 
normative or controversial, or for having unfalsifiable theories" 
[Lavoie, p. 582]. 
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